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Case No. 20141013 -CA 
Dist. Ct. Case No. 131911063MO 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Howe is a homeless man who tries to navigate his way through the city as 
seamlessly as possible. Mr. Howe considers himself to be an eccentric and introverted 
person. As part of his navigation, Mr. Howe will often sit under a tree in a park to think 
and rest. He doesn't particularly like sitting under the same tree more than once and will 
find various places to sit throughout the city. In March of 2013, Mr. Howe had a severe 
case of frostbite wherein his right leg was amputated just above the knee and several of 
his toes on his left leg were also lost. As a result of the frostbite and amputation Mr. 
Howe suffers from poor circulation. 
In September 2014, only six months after his amputation, Mr. Howe was using a 
new prosthetic leg that was causing him pain. Mr. Howe found a tree in a park and sat 
down to rest his leg. It was a chilly September day, and due to his poor circulation, Mr. 
Howe is more susceptible to the colder conditions; therefore, Mr. Howe put his jacket 
over his leg to keep warm. Mr. Howe sat and got lost in thought, which he is prone to 
doing. The next thing Mr. Howe knew, he was being questioned by the police about his 
alleged "unsavory" activity - allegedly masturbating in the park. The officers questioned 
Mr. Howe about a wet spot he had on the front of his pants. Mr. Howe testified he suffers 
from urinary incontinence. Mr. Howe explained that he is a religious man and does not 
believe that such behavior is appropriate. Although the officers neither officer knew what 
the spot on Mr. Howe's pants was from and never had the spot tested, Mr. Howe was 
charged and convicted for Lewdness Involving a Child. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment for Lewdness 
involving a child, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code §76-9-702.5. R. 43-
45, attached as Addendum A. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code §78A-4-
103(2)( e). See addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue I: Whether insufficient evidence compels dismissal of the jury's verdict 
finding Mr. Howe guilty of lewdness involving a child. 
Standard of Review: When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, appellate 
courts review the facts in a light most favorable to a jury verdict. See State v. Samples, 
2012 UT App 52, ,r9, 272 P.3d 788 (citing State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r18, 10 P.3d 
346). "An appellate court should overturn a conviction for insufficient evidence when it 
is apparent that there is not sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the crime 
charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant 
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committed the crime." State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, ,r12, 985 P.2d 911 (citations 
omitted). Reversal is required "when the evidence ... is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Hirschi, 
2007 UT App 255, ifl5, 167 P.3d 503 (citations and internal quotations omitted). See 
also State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ,r 16,210 P.3d 288. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved when, at the close of the State's case, 
defense counsel moved the trial court to dismiss based on the City's failure to present 
sufficient evidence that the offense occurred. R. 94: 17-21. 
RULES, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutory provision is determinative of the issue on 
appeal. See Addendum B. 
A person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person under 
circumstances not amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child, 
sodomy upon a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a 
child, or an attempt to commit any of those offenses, intentionally or 
knowingly does any of the following to, or in the presence of, a child who 
is under 14 years of age: 
(c) masturbates; 1 
' The City prosecuted this case solely under the allegation that Mr. Howe was 
masturbating in a park. Therefore, throughout the entirety of this brief, when the 
3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On November 20, 2013, an information was filed by Salt Lake City, alleging that 
on or about September 14, 2013, Joseph Howe committed a single count of lewdness 
involving a child, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code section 76-9-702.5. 
R. 1-2. Ajurytrial was held in the Third District Court on September 29, 2014 before 
the Honorable Judge Deno Himonas. After deliberations, the jury found Mr. Howe 
guilty. R. 64:137. Mr. Howe filed a timely appeal. R. 56. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Mr. Howe is a homeless man who attempts to navigate through the city without 
bothering people. R. 64:97. He likes to visit different parks and sit under different trees; 
he prefers not to sit under the same tree twice. R. 64:97- 98. On September 14, 2013, 
Mr. Howe was sitting under a tree in a park thinking and resting his amputated leg. R. 
64:96. It was chilly out that day, and due to Mr. Howe's amputation, he can only walk so 
far, thus creating poor circulation. R. 64:98. Since, it is hard for him to keep his 
extremities warm, Mr. Howe draped his jacket over his legs while he rested. R. 64:98. 
The park was on 1300 South 800 East in Salt Lake City, Utah and Mr. Howe was 
Appellant refers to the relevant statute it is only in reference to subsection (l)(c) of the 
statute. 
2 The relevant facts are based on testimony given by witnesses, the responding officers, 
and Mr. Howe at trial on September 29, 2014. 
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sitting under one of three trees on the East side, approximately 10 - 15 feet from a 
children's playground and an off-leash dog park. R. 64:57, 60, 84. On that day there 
were approximately a dozen children ranging from 2 to 13 playing in the playground 
area. R 64:58. 
Officers Miles Southworth and Harrison Livsey came to this park in response to a 
"suspicious" man allegedly masturbating in the park. R. 64:77. Both officers approached 
Mr. Howe who matched the description given by the caller. R. 64:77. The officers began 
questioning Mr. Howe regarding why he was in the park and why he picked that 
particular tree to sit under. R. 64:83. Mr. Howe explained to Officer Livsey that he is 
homeless and does not like to sit under the same tree multiple times, so he picks different 
trees around the city to sit under. R. 64:83. This particular tree was a new spot for him. 
Mr. Howe further explained that he was using a prosthetic leg and had to rest from time 
to time because of the pain of adjusting to the prosthesis on his stump. R 64:96. Mr. 
Howe also explained that he had poor circulation related to his suffering from frostbite in 
the past. R. 64:98. 
During the investigation, Officer Southworth observed a small wet spot on the 
front of Mr. Howe's pants that he could not identify. R. 64:81, 88. Mr. Howe explained 
to the officers that the wet spot was urine due to urinary incontinence. R. 64:85, 101. 
Officer Livsey then explained to Mr. Howe the allegation that someone in the park 
thought he was masturbating. R 64:84. Mr. Howe explained that he was a religious 
person and would not engage in such behavior. R. 64:84. 
After the close of the City's case in chief, Mr. Howe moved for a directed verdict 
5 
on the basis that the City failed to present sufficient evidence from which it could be 
reasonably inferred that Mr. Howe committed the offense of lewdness involving a child. 
The district court denied Mr. Howe's motion. R. 64:94. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
To be guilty of lewdness involving a child, a person must knowingly and 
intentionally engage in a lewd act, in this case, masturbation, in the presence of a person 
14 years of age or younger. This offense requires the prosecuting agency to prove three 
distinct elements. First, there is a specific intent that must be proved. Second, the statute 
requires that the act be conducted in the presence of a person 14 years of age or younger. 
Third, that Mr. Howe engaged in a lewd act, specifically, masturbation. 
Here, Mr. Howe moved for a directed verdict at the close of the City's case in 
chief on the basis that it failed to produce sufficient evidence prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt on each of the three essential elements of the crime charged. Although there was 
evidence presented that Mr. Howe was sitting in a park where children were playing in 
the playground, there was insufficient evidence to show that Mr. Howe was actually 
engaged in any criminal conduct nor that he had the intent to masturbate in the presence 
of children. There was no testimony from any child present, and the testimony from the 
witnesses demonstrated that none of the children saw or even acknowledged Mr. Howe's 
presence. Accordingly, the district court's denial of Mr. Howe's motion for directed 
verdict constitutes legal error and Mr. Howe now asks this Court to reverse the denial of 
his motion for a directed verdict. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. This Court Should Reverse the District Court's Decision Denying Mr. Howe's 
Motion for Directed Verdict. 
Mr. Howe challenges the district court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict 
on the basis that the City presented insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the City failed to produce 
sufficient evidence regarding the three necessary elements in the statute. See Utah Code 
§ 76-9-702.5 
First, the City failed to produce sufficient evidence that Mr. Howe was actually 
engaged in a lewd act, specifically, masturbation. Second, the City failed to produce 
sufficient evidence that Mr. Howe acted with the requisite mental state to wit: that Mr. 
Howe acted intentionally or knowingly. Finally, the City failed to produce sufficient 
evidence that Mr. Howe was in the presence of children such that they would be capable 
of observing or hearing the behavior that Mr. Howe was allegedly engaged in. 
To illustrate that there was insufficient evidence presented at the time of a directed 
verdict to meet the prosecution's burden of proof, the appellant must marshal the 
evidence and demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution. Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, ,i 11, 51 P.3d 724. See 
also, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). The marshaling 
requirement is "a natural extension of an appellant's burden of persuasion." State v. 
Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, i\41, 326 P.3d 645, 654. See also id. at ,i 43 (repudiating the 
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marshaling requirement "of playing devil's advocate and of presenting every scrap of 
competent evidence in a comprehensive and fastidious order"); id. ir,r 33-43 (reviewing 
the purpose of the marshaling requirement to conclude that noncompliance is not a basis 
to not reach the merits of an appellant's argument). 
To comply with the marshaling requirement, it is necessary to define the 
evidentiary scope of this court's review. Because this is a motion for a directed verdict 
made at the close of the City's case in chief, it is appropriate to only review the facts that 
were admitted in evidence at the time the motion was made. Limiting the Court's review 
to this evidence is appropriate because, first it is the evidence that the district court 
considered in making its ruling and, second, because it is the evidence the City presented 
and relied upon to satisfy its burden of proof. See Utah Code §7-17-3 ("When it appears 
to the court that there is not sufficient evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it shall 
forthwith order him discharged."); Utah R. Crim. P. 17(p) ("At the conclusion of the 
evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue 
an order dismissing any information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground 
that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any 
lesser included offense."). Accordingly, the evidence marshaled will be limited to that 
which was presented at the close of the City's case in chief. 
A. In denying Mr. Howe's motion/or directed verdict, the district court 
erroneously found that a reasonable jury could reasonably infer, from the 
evidence presented, that Mr. Howe actually committed the act of masturbation. 
The district court erred as a matter of law in denying Mr. Howe's motion for a 
directed verdict when it found that the City had met its burden in proving that a jury 
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could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Howe was actually engaged in the act of 
masturbating. 
The issue presented in this case is whether the City presented sufficient evidence 
to prove Mr. Howe was engaged in a lewd act, specifically, masturbation. As there was 
no direct evidence admitted to prove that Mr. Howe was engaged in masturbation, the 
City relied on only circumstantial evidence. When the prosecution relies on 
circumstantial evidence to prove an element of a crime, the reviewing court must 
determine whether there is any evidence to support that element of the charged crime and 
whether the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and 
reasonable human experience sufficient to prove that element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993). 
"While it is sometimes subtle, there is in fact a difference between drawing a 
reasonable inference and merely speculating about possibilities." State v. Cristobal, 2010 
UT App 228, ,I 16,238 P.3d 1096 (quoting State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, ,I 16, 3 
P.3d 725). "A reasonable inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts 
and deducing a logical consequence from them." Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, ,I 16 
(quoting Hester, 2000 UT App 159, iI 16 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 781 (7th ed. 
1999)). Conversely, speculation is defined as the act or practice of theorizing about 
matters over which there is no certain knowledge." Id. 
The line between a reasonable inference that may permissibly be 
drawn by a jury from basic facts in evidence and an impermissible 
speculation is not drawn by judicial idiosyncrasies. The line is drawn 
by the laws of logic. If there is an experience of logical probability 
that an ultimate fact will follow a stated narrative or historical fact, 
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then the jury is given the opportunity to draw a conclusion because 
there is a reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from the 
proven facts. . . [T]he essential requirement is that mere speculation 
not be allowed to do duty for probative facts after making due 
allowance for all reasonably possible inferences .... 
Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, ,i 16 ( quoting Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 
811 P.2d 511, 521 (10th Cir. 1987)). "Thus, the distinction between reasonable inference 
and speculation is intensely fact-based." Id. "When evidence supports only one possible 
conclusion, the quality of the inference rests on the reasonable probability that the 
conclusion flows from the proven facts." Id. "When the evidence supports more than 
one possible conclusion, none more likely than the other, the choice of one possibility 
over another can be no more than speculation; while a reasonable inference arises when 
the facts can reasonably be interpreted to support a conclusion that one possibility is more 
probable than another." Id; see also Salt Lake City v. Gallegos, 2015 UT App 78, ,i 10, 
34 7 P.3d 842. 
The distinction between reasonable inference and speculation must be viewed in 
the context of the applicable standard of review. The standard of review for a directed 
verdict requires there to be some evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that 
the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Montoya, 
2004 UT 5, ,i 29, 84 P.3d 1183. It follows that under this standard, the reasonable 
inferences drawn from the evidence must be of a quantum or quality that is capable of 
satisfying the City's burden of proof to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt in 
the mind ofa reasonable juror. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ,i 41, 70 P.3d 111. 
("When evaluating whether the [prosecution] produced sufficient believable evidence to 
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withstand a challenge at the close of [its] case in chier' there must be facts in evidence 
"capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
In Salt Lake City v. Gallegos, the defendant was charged with failing to stop at the 
command of law enforcement. 2015 UT App 78, 11 1. Officers responded to a report that 
several men were wrestling in an alley and two of the men were reported as wearing red 
clothing. Id. 112. One of the officers saw Mr. Gallegos who was wearing a red stripe shirt 
in an adjacent alleyway. Id. ,i 3. Mr. Gallegos made eye contact with the officer and then 
turned and ran away. Id. The officer pursued Mr. Gallegos and commanded him to stop. 
Id. Mr. Gallegos continued to run eventually hiding behind a shed. Id. As the officer 
began searching the area, Gallegos came out from behind the shed and apologized saying 
he did not know he was being chased by a cop. Id. 
The City presented evidence at trial that Mr. Gallegos had scrapes on his hands 
and arms and matched the description of a caller who had reported an altercation in the 
area. Id. 1110. From this evidence, the City argued, a reasonable jury could infer that Mr. 
Gallegos fled the scene with the intent to avoid arrest. Id. The district court denied Mr. 
Gallegos' motion for directed verdict based on insufficient evidence. Id. 11 4 This Court 
pointed out that while it was reasonable to infer that Mr. Gallegos was involved in an 
altercation, "there was no evidence suggesting the possibility [ defendant] was a willing 
participant in a criminal altercation was more likely than the possibility he was an 
unwilling or innocent victim of an assault." Id. ,r 10. 
Here, the City presented evidence by three witnesses-all of whom testified to the 
same thing-that no one saw Mr. Howe commit the act of masturbation. Scott Lindsley, 
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Debra Lindsley, and Cameron Buie were all at the park on the date and time in question. 
Mr. and Mrs. Lindsley were there with their two children ages six and twelve. R. 64:58. 
Mr. Buie was also at the park with his wife and daughter. R. 64:72. 
While at the park, the three of them each noticed Mr. Howe sitting under a tree 
with all of his belongings. Mr. Lindsley testified that he noticed Mr. Howe with a jacket 
over his lap, and believed Mr. Howe was masturbating because his arms were moving 
under his jacket. R. 64:59, R. 64:60-61. However, Mr. Lindsley was 25 feet away, 
behind a tree, and never saw Mr. Howe's legs, never saw Mr. Howe's hands, never saw 
Mr. Howe's genitalia, and never saw beneath the jacket that was draped over Mr. Howe's 
legs. R. 64:62. Indeed, Mr. Lindsley merely speculated that Mr. Howe was masturbating 
because he was a homeless man sitting under a tree making movements that made Mr. 
Lindsley uncomfortable. R. 64:58-59. 
Similar to Mr. Lindsley, Mrs. Lindsley saw Mr. Howe approximately 20 to 30 feet 
away from inside the dog park. R. 64:68. Mrs. Lindsley never saw Mr. Howe's hands, 
legs, genitalia, or any specific act of masturbation. R. 64:69. Mrs. Lindsley saw Mr. 
Howe sitting under a tree moving his arms under the sweatshirt that was on his lap. R. 
64:68-69. Finally, just like Mr. and Mrs. Lindsley, Mr. Buie saw Mr. Howe's arms 
moving while his hands were under a jacket over his lap. Again, Mr. Buie never saw Mr. 
Howe's legs, hands, genitalia, or anything under the jacket that was on his lap. R. 64:74-
75. In sum, these three witnesses saw Mr. Howe sitting under a tree with a jacket over 
his lap. They observed his upper arms moving while under the jacket, but nothing else 




Moreover, testimony by the responding officers fails to shed light on the situation 
or present evidence making one possibility more likely than another. When the officers 
arrived on the scene they observed Mr. Howe sitting by the tree with his belongings and a 
jacket draped over his lap. R. 64:78. They did not observe any arm movement or any 
indication that Mr. Howe was masturbating. R. 64:78. When they approached him, 
Officer Livsey questioned Mr. Howe regarding his presence in the park, specifically why 
Mr. Howe had chosen to sit under that particular tree in the park. R. 54:83. Mr. Howe 
explained that he does not like to sit under the same tree twice and he had not yet sat 
under that particular tree. R. 64:83. Mr. Howe explained that he had sat down because 
his new prosthetic caused him pain and he needed to rest from time to time. R. 64:96. 
Because Mr. Howe is homeless, he has nowhere else to rest but the park. R. 64:96. 
During their interrogation, the officers asked Mr. Howe to remove his jacket and 
confronted him with the allegation that people thought he had been masturbating. R. 
64:84. Mr. Howe denied the allegation explaining that he is a very religious person and 
does not believe that masturbation is appropriate behavior. R. 64:84. Also while 
questioning Mr. Howe, the officers noticed a wet spot with the diameter of approximately 
two inches on Mr. Howe's pants near the crotch area. R. 64:84. When asked about this 
spot, Mr. Howe explained that he was suffering from a medical condition similar to 
incontinence. R. 64:101. The officers testified that they did not actually know and did 
not test the spot. Both officers admitted that the spot could have been anything from 
urine to Mr. Howe having spilled something on himself. R. 64:81; R. 64:88. 
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When circumstantial evidence is used to prove an essential element of a crime, 
inferences made from that evidence must have a foundation in logic and human 
experiences. Workman, 852 P.2d at 984. And, where more than one outcome is possible, 
the choice of one outcome over another must be more than mere speculation. Cristobal, 
2010 UT App 228, ,r 16. 
Mr. Howe is a homeless man with a recent amputation. R. 64:97. He is familiar 
with the park systems and sits under a different tree to think and rest. R. 64:97. In fact, 
he often finds himself so lost in thought that it is nearly trance-like. R. 64: I 00. That day, 
Mr. Howe sat down because his prosthesis was causing him pain and he needed to rest. 
R. 64:96. Further, Mr. Howe has poor circulation in his leg and it was chilly out, so he 
draped his jacket over his legs. R. 64:98. 
Based on the above facts, there are a variety of fact patterns that could be inferred 
from the evidence presented, none more likely than the other. Mr. Howe was just as 
likely massaging his leg to help with the circulation in his leg that had been recently 
amputated. The evidence provided is not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, 
one alternative over another. The evidence simply lacks sufficiency to conclude that Mr. 
Howe was, in fact, masturbating. Accordingly, the district court erred in denying Mr. 
Howe's motion for directed verdict and this Court should reverse. 
B. In denying Mr. Howe 's motion for a directed verdict, the district court 
impermissibly reasoned that the jury, with the evidence presented, could infer 
Mr. Howe's mens rea. 
The district court erred as a matter oflaw in denying Mr. Howe's motion for a 
directed verdict when it found that the City had met its burden in proving Mr. Howe 
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intentionally or knowingly committed the act of masturbation in the presence of a child. 
Utah Code §76-9-702.5 requires that a person "intentionally or knowingly" commits an 
act of lewdness "in the presence of a person who was under 14 years of age." Id. 
Utah Code §76-2-103 defines intentionally as acting in such a manner that it is the 
actor's "conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Id. 
subsection (1 ). The section continues defining knowingly with respect to conduct or 
circumstances surrounding conduct "when [the actor] is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances," and "with respect to a result of his conduct when 
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." Id. subsection (2). 
While this Court has recognized that "a defendant's mental state can be proven by 
circumstantial evidence, including the nature and extent of the criminal act," it has also 
recognized that when proving the mental state through circumstantial evidence, the 
inferences drawn from that evidence must have "'a basis in logic and reasonable human 
experience sufficient to prove that [the defendant] possessed the requisite intent." State 
v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, iI 179,299 P.3d 892. Here, the City failed to provide sufficient 
evidence, circumstantial or direct, wherein a reasonable jury could reasonably find that 
Mr. Howe intentionally or knowingly masturbated in the presence of a person under the 
age of 14. 
Mrs. Lindsley noted that Mr. Howe was in the same position with the same 
expression for somewhere between IO - 20 minutes. He did not move nor did his 
expression change. R. 64:70. Mr. Howe explained that he sometimes gets lost in thought, 
as ifhe were in a trance. R. 64:100. He explained that at times he will fixate on an object 
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but not really take into consideration what that object is or what is happening around him. 
R. 64: 100. Mr. Howe also explained that he was aware there were children in the park 
but he had no interest in looking at them and was not thinking about them. R. 64:97. 
Instead, Mr. Howe was absent-mindedly lost in his own thoughts. Id. 
The City failed to present sufficient evidence regarding Mr. Howe's intent or 
knowledge. In fact, his focus did not change for 10 to 20 minutes and he did not seem to 
be focused on anything in particular. R. 64:70. Because the City failed to provide 
sufficient evidence to establish this element, the district court erred in denying Mr. 
Howe's motion for a directed verdict. Accordingly, this Court should overturn the 
district court's denial. 
C. In denying Mr. Howe's motion for a directed verdict, the district court 
impermissibly reasoned that the jury, with the evidence presented, could 
reasonably find that Mr. Howe was in the presence of children 
Utah Code §76-9-702.5 requires that a person commit the act of lewdness "to, or 
in the presence of, a child who is under 14 years of age." Utah Code §76-9-702.5 (1) 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Lewdness Statute"). Nowhere within the Lewdness 
Statute or the section of the code related to lewdness is "in the presence of a child" 
defined. Utah Code §§76-9-702, -702.5. However, section 76-5-109.1 (Domestic 
Violence in the Presence of a Child, hereinafter referred to as the "Domestic Violence 
Statute") defines "in the presence of a child" as either being "in the physical presence of a 
child" or "having knowledge that a child is present and may see or hear an act of 
domestic violence." Utah Code §76-5-109.1. While this definition provides guidance as 
to the meaning of "in the presence of a child" the definition as it relates to the Lewdness 
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Statute must be interpreted so as not to be vague or overbroad. See State v. Lopes, 1999 
UT 24, 1]18, 980 P.2d 191 (citation omitted) (stating, "[t]he general rule is 'that statutes, 
where possible, are to be construed so as to sustain their constitutionality."'). 
Furthermore, the statute must be read as a whole "so as to produce a harmonious whole 
and to give effect to the intent and purpose to be divined from the entire act." State v. 
Serepente, 768 p.2d 994, 997 (Ut. App. 1989). 
This "cardinal rule" also includes the title of the statute when the plain language of 
the body of the statute "is lacking clarity." Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranch 
Co., 18 Utah 2.d 45, 48,414 P.2d 963 (Utah 1966). In Island Ranch Co., the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that many court opinions, including many of its own, held that 
the title of a statute is not part of the operation of a statute. Id. The title of a statute 
cannot, however, be used to "contradict or defeat a plainly expressed intent; nor can it be 
used to create an ambiguity or uncertainty when the language of the body of the act is 
clear." Id. However, the Court went on to hold that the title of a statute may be used to 
"shed light on and clarify the meaning" of the body of the statute. Id.; see also State v. 
Gallegos, 2007 UT App 81, ,i 16 (using the title of the statute to assist in interpreting a 
statute, "The title of a statute is not part of the text of a statute, and absent ambiguity, it is 
generally not used to determine a statute's intent. However, it is persuasive and can 'aid 
in ascertaining [the statute's] correct interpretation and application." (citations omitted)). 
By drafting two distinct statutes, with two distinct titles, the legislature created two 
distinct crimes. This means that the Lewdness Statute has different elements from the 
Domestic Violence Statute. Compare Utah Code §§76-9-702.5 and 76-5-109.1. Further, 
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the legislature purposefully included a definition of "in the presence of a child" in the 
section regarding the Domestic Violence Statue, and did not include such a definition in 
the Lewdness Statute. Utah Code §76-9-702.5. By looking at the titles of the two 
different statutes, ("Lewdness Involving a Child" compared to "Domestic Violence in the 
Presence of a Child"), and the plain meaning of the language of the body of the statutes, 
there is clear indication that the person under 14 years of age has more than a passive role 
in the Lewdness Statute. Utah Code §76-9-702.5. 
Webster's Dictionary defines "involve" as: "l. to cause (someone) to be included 
in some activity, situation, etc. 2. to cause (someone) to take part in something; 3. to 
cause (someone) to be associate with someone or something." Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com. (last visited June 26, 2015). "Presence," 
on the other hand, is defined as: "1. the fact of being in a particular place, the state of 
being present; 2. the area that is close to someone; 3. someone or something that is seen 
or noticed in a particular place, area, etc." Id. 
Given these definitions, in combination with the body of the statute, and through a 
reading that does not create either a vague or overbroad statute, lewdness involving a 
child requires evidence demonstrating that the child was more than merely be in the same 
area as the alleged conduct was taking place. Indeed, the plain language of the statute 
requires that the child has to be included, take part, or associate with the activity or 
someone conducting the activity. Utah Code §76-9-702.5. In other words, it is not 
sufficient to merely present evidence that there were children in or around the area. There 
must be sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the child or children were aware of the 
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act - that they were involved. Here, the City failed to present such evidence. 
At trial, all three witnesses testified that there were children in the area, but that 
the children were playing in the playground and were at least 10 to 15 feet away. There 
was no testimony from any child that was present that day, and the testimony from the 
three witnesses demonstrated that, to the best of their knowledge, their children did not 
see or acknowledge Mr. Howe's presence. R. 64:63; R. 64:70; R. 64:76. This evidence 
is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any of Mr. Howe's actions 
"involved" children within the plain meaning of the statute. Because the City failed to 
present sufficient evidence on the necessary elements, the trial court erred in denying Mr. 
Howe's motion for a directed verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Howe respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the district court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict. 
SUBMITTED thisdday of July, 2~26 ,/_. 
~f!J :;;::rr:::J1l \ 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
19 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, AMY N. FOWLER, certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the original 
and seven copies of the foregoing brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th 
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Salt Lake City 
Prosecutor's Office, 349 South 200 East, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
~ day of July, 2015. 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
In compliance with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(I), I 
certify that this brief contains 5,403 words, excluding the table of contents, table of 
authorities, addenda, and certificates of compliance and delivery . In compliance with the 
typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P. 27(b), I certify that this brief has been prepared 
in a proportionally spaced font using Microsoft Word 2010 in Times New Roman 13 
point. 






INDEX TO ADDENDA 
Addendum A: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 





3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 





Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jennifaj 




SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
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DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
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Audio 
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CHARGES 
1. LEWDNESS INVOLVING A CHILD - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 09/29/2014 Guilty 
TRIAL 
910-914 Court discuss with parties status of trial going forward 
939-950 Defendant wishes to go forward with trial, parties invoked 
the exclusionary rule 
1010 Jury Panel is sworn and voir dire begins. 
Court raised Batson issues and hears from parties. Court rules no 
issues. Ms Fowler maintains her objection. 
1100 Jury sworn in and excused for a break. 
Counsel reviews preliminary instructions, no objections. 
Prior to returning Juror passes a note to the Court stating his 
brother in-law is Steve Nelson. Court rules no issues. Ms Fowler 
objects on the record and is over ruled. 
1113 Jury returns, Preliminary Instructions are read. 
1123 Opening statements 
1130 City calls Scott Lindsley is sworn in and testifies. 
1137 Cross-examination. 1139 Re-direct. 1140 Re-cross. 
1141 Debra Lindsley is sworn in and testifies. 
1146 Cross-examination. 
1151 Cameron Buie is sworn in and testifies. 1156 
Cross-examination. 
1158 Officer Southworth is sworn in and testifies. 1203 
Cross-examination. 
1206 Officer Livsely is sworn in and testifies. 1211 
Cross-examination. 
1215 Juror passes note with question, Parties stipulate to 
Printed: 09/29/14 15:24:54 Page 1 
Case No: 131911063 Date: Sep 29, 2014 
question. What is screening process? 
1217 Redirect. 1217 Juror passes another note. Was there a 
bottle of water around him? 
1219 Re-cross. 1221 Re-direct. 1221 City rests. Jury is excused 
for a quick break. Defense motions for a directed verdict. Motion 
is denied. 
1232 Defendant takes the stand and Jury is returned. 
Defense calls the Defendant as their first witness. 
1234 Joseph Howe is sworn in and testifies. 1242 
Cross-examination. 
1246 Defense rests. 1247 Jury is excused for lunch break. 
Counsel works on jury instructions. 
108 court is in recess 149 Jury returns, final jury instructions 
are read 204 city places closing statement on the record 207 
defense places closing statement on the record 219 city rebuttal 
statement 224 Bailiff is sworn and jurors are excused for delibe 
rations 320 Jury Returns with a verdict, and finds the defendant 
guilty to count one as charged. Defendant waives time for 
sentencing 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of LEWDNESS INVOLVING A CHILD a 
Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 100 
day(s) 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 100 day(s) previously served. 
SENTENCE JAIL RELEASE TIME NOTE 
court orders for defendant to be released 
Defendant has 30 days to appeal sentence 
CUSTODY 










76-9-702.5. Lewdness involving a child 
Lewdness involving a child 
( l) A person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person under circumstances 
not amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, sexual 
abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, or an attempt to commit any of those 
offenses, intentionally or knowingly does any of the following to, or in the presence of, a 
child who is under 14 years of age: 
(a) perfonns an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy; 
(b) exposes his or her genitals, the female breast below the top of the areola, the 
buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area: 
(i) in a public place; or 
(ii) in a private place: 
(A) under circumstances the person should know will likely cause affront or alarm; or 
(B) with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor or the child; 
(c) masturbates; 
( d) under circumstances not amounting to sexual exploitation of a child under Section 
76-Sb-201, causes a child under the age of 14 years to expose his or her genitals, anus, or 
breast, if female, to the actor, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the 
actor or the child; or 
(e) performs any other act of lewdness. 
(2) 
(a) Lewdness involving a child is a class A misdemeanor, except under Subsection 
(2)(b). 
(b) Lewdness involving a child is a third degree felony if at the time of the violation: 
(i) the person is a sex offender as defined in Section 77-27-21.7; or 
(ii) the person has previously been convicted of a violation of this section. 
Amended by Chapter 278, 2013 General Session 
